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Abstract 
How can quantum mechanics be (i) the fundamental theoretical framework of contemporary physics and 
(ii) a probability calculus that presupposes the events to which, and on the basis of which, it assigns 
probabilities? The question is answered without invoking knowledge or observers, by interpreting the 
necessary distinction between two kinds of physical quantities — unconditionally definite quantities and 
quantities that have values only if they are measured — as a distinction between the manifested world and 
its manifestation. 
 
Quantum mechanics is seen by many as the fundamental theoretical framework of 
contemporary physics. To the extent that the theory is testable, however, it is but a probability 
calculus: the so-called quantum state is determined by a preparation of the system (which, as 
every experimental physicist knows, includes a classical description of the setup), and it assigns 
probabilities to the possible outcomes of any subsequent measurement. A quantum state thus 
presupposes not only a classically describable setup but also classically describable outcome-
indicating devices with classically describable outcome-indicating properties. Since quantum 
mechanics presupposes these things, it cannot be called upon to account for their existence. 
How, then, can it be the fundamental theoretical framework of contemporary physics? 
One way to dispose of this problem is to deny its existence, either by asserting that quantum 
mechanics cannot ultimately be the fundamental theoretical framework for physics or by 
denying that quantum mechanics is essentially a probability calculus. Among those who haven’t 
yet given up on the challenge to understand what quantum mechanics is trying to tell us about 
the world, the second option is vastly more popular. It does, however, raise the problem of 
objectification, and this has been shown to be insoluble (Busch et al., 1996; Mittelstaedt, 1998). 
What measurement theorists mean by “objectification” is the coming into existence of an actual 
outcome (as against an entangled state of the system, the apparatus, and possibly the observer) 
at the end of a measurement process. Insoluble problems are likely to arise from false 
assumptions. In this particular case the false assumption is that quantum mechanics ought to 
account for the existence of the events to which it serves to assign probabilities. 
Proponents of the many-worlds extravaganza claim to have “solved” this problem by letting the 
universe, including observers, split into as many copies of itself as there are outcomes every time 
1 Published (without the Appendix) in Cosmology Vol. 24, April 2, 2016: 
http://cosmology.com/ConsciousnessUniverse3.html. 
While the published paper touches on various ways in which quantum mechanics does not have to do with 
consciousness, the Appendix concerns what quantum mechanics has to do with consciousness. 
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something qualifying as a measurement takes place. Suffice it to say that many-worlds 
interpretations, like other realist interpretations of the wave function, face a number of issues 
that have by no means been resolved (Barrett, 1999; Saunders et al., 2010; Marchildon, 2015). 
At the root of all such issues is the problem of conjuring correlata out of correlations or events 
out of probabilities of events. 
Does it help to invoke the consciousness of the observer or to take the view that quantum 
mechanics is an epistemic theory, concerned not with the world per se but with our knowledge 
or information about it? What can be rejected at once is the view that nature obeys the unitary 
laws of quantum mechanics except when an outcome-indicating property “enters” the 
consciousness of an observer. It is not surprising that von Neumann (1931), the inventor of the 
tripartite formulation of the process of measurement (consisting of system preparation, unitary 
evolution, and objectification), felt compelled to hold this view. 
Those who hold with Peierls (1991) that a quantum state “represents our knowledge of the 
system we are trying to describe” (original emphasis) are saying two things: a quantum state is a 
“compendium of probabilities” (Fuchs and Peres, 2000), which is correct, and probabilities are 
inherently epistemic, which isn’t. Until the advent of quantum mechanics all known 
probabilities were epistemic; they were ignorance probabilities. We resort to such probabilities 
whenever there are unknown matters of fact — matters of fact that would allow us to make 
predictions with certainty if they were known. If there are no matters of fact that, if known, 
would allow us to make predictions with certainty, the reason we cannot do better than assign 
probabilities is not lack of knowledge. This gives us every right to look upon the probabilities we 
then assign as objective. (It’s just plain unfortunate that the term “objective probability” came to 
be used for something that isn’t a probability, to wit, a relative frequency.) 
Here is another reason why (or another sense in which) quantum-mechanical probabilities are 
objective. The objects of everyday experience “occupy” space (i.e., they have spatial extent), and 
they neither explode nor collapse as soon as they come into being. If quantum mechanics has 
anything to say about these objects, it is that they are “made” of finite numbers of particles 
which lack spatial extent (quarks and electrons), and which are therefore routinely described as 
pointlike. (Three quarks “make” a nucleon; a finite number of nucleons “make” an atomic 
nucleus; and a finite number of nuclei and electrons “make” the chair you trust to support you.) 
Thanks to quantum mechanics, we also know that the existence of space-occupying objects rests 
on the objective fuzziness of their internal relative positions and momenta (Mohrhoff, 2009a, 
2011a). The standard term for this fuzziness — “uncertainty” — is seriously misleading, for what 
“fluffs out” those objects cannot be anyone’s ignorance of the exact values of their internal 
relative positions and momenta. It can only be an objective indeterminacy of these values. What, 
then, is the proper way to describe the objective indeterminacy of a physical quantity? It is to 
assign probabilities to the possible outcomes of a measurement of this quantity. But if we 
quantify objective indeterminacies by means of probability distributions, the probabilities used 
for this purpose have every right to be considered objective. 
As said, quantum mechanics presupposes outcome-indicating devices with outcome-indicating 
properties. This means it requires us to distinguish between two kinds of measurable quantities: 
those that have definite values if and only if they are measured, and those that possess definite 
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values whether or not they are measured. In a two-slit experiment, for instance, the slit taken by 
a particle has a definite value (left or right) only if it is measured, while the outcome-indicating 
property, from which the slit taken by the particle can be inferred (no matter whether anyone is 
around to make the inference), has an unconditionally definite value. What is the meaning of 
this dualism? What does it tell us about the nature of Nature? Arguably this is the most 
profound question raised by the quantum theory. 
A possible answer is to invoke the age-old metaphysical distinction between the world as we 
know or experience it and the world as it is in itself, and to argue that unconditionally definite 
quantities belong to the former while quantities that have values only if they are measured 
belong to the latter. Nobody has defended this view more persistently and more consistently 
than d’Espagnat (1989, 1995), who distinguished between an empirical reality and a reality 
independent of human minds, which is “veiled.” Because quantum mechanics forces us to make 
this distinction, he argued, “the full elision of the subject” (Bitbol, 1990) cannot be achieved. We 
cannot pretend that quantum mechanics describes a reality independent of human minds. 
It is, however, possible to make sense of the necessity of distinguishing between the two kinds of 
measurable quantities without invoking consciousness, experience, or the subject. The key is to 
view the distinction as a distinction between the manifested world and its manifestation 
(Mohrhoff 2014ab, 2016). This view has the further advantage of extending our knowledge 
beyond the empirical reality of d’Espagnat, which corresponds to the manifested world. While 
the correlata belong to the manifested world, the correlations — those between the outcomes of 
measurements made on the same system at different times as well as those between the 
outcomes of measurements made on different systems at the same or at different times — 
extend our knowledge beyond the manifested world. The possibility of knowledge concerning 
the manifestation of the world, moreover, argues against a reduction of objectivity to inter-
subjectivity. If the objective world would correspond to the experienced world (minus the 
position and the time whence it is experienced by a subject), there could be no such knowledge. 
So what does quantum mechanics tell us about the manifestation of the world? Let us begin by 
considering the following scattering experiment. Initially two identical particles — particles 
lacking properties by which they can be distinguished — are found moving northward and 
southward, respectively. The next thing we know is that the same two particles are found to be 
moving eastward and westward, respectively. The question then is: which incoming particle is 
identical with which outgoing particle? It is well known that this question has no answer. The 
distinction we make between the two possible identifications cannot be objectified (i.e., cannot 
be regarded as corresponding to an objective difference). 
Here as elsewhere, unanswerable questions tend to arise from false assumptions. In this 
particular case, the question implicitly assumes that we are dealing with two things rather than 
with the same thing detected twice — a single entity initially moving both northward and 
southward and subsequently moving both eastward and westward. If the incoming particles 
(and therefore the outgoing ones as well) are one and the same entity, the question “Which is 
which?” can no longer be asked. What needs to be borne in mind here is that quantum 
mechanics does not tell us what (if anything) happens between measurements, except other 
measurements. As Peres (1984) put it succinctly, “there is no interpolating wave function giving 
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the ‘state of the system’ between measurements.” What’s more, there is no compelling reason to 
believe that the intrinsic identity of the two particles ceases when it ceases to have observable 
consequences owing to the presence of properties by which they can be distinguished and re-
indentified. We are free to take the view that all particles in existence are identical in the strong 
sense of numerical identity. What presents itself here and now with these properties and what 
presents itself there and then with those properties is one and the same entity. I shall refer to it 
simply as “Being.” 
While fundamental particles are routinely described as pointlike, what is meant is that they lack 
internal structure. Lack of internal structure is consistent with either a pointlike form or no form 
at all. See Mohrhoff (2014a, Sect. 9) for reasons why fundamental particles ought to be 
conceived as formless. But if every fundamental particle in existence is (i) identically the same 
Being and (ii) formless, then the shapes of things resolve themselves into reflexive spatial 
relations — i.e., relations between Being and Being. By entering into (or entertaining) reflexive 
spatial relations (relative positions and relative orientations), Being supports (i) what looks like 
a multiplicity of relata if the reflexive quality of the relations is ignored, and (ii) what looks like a 
substantial expanse if the spatial quality of the relations is reified. 
This way of thinking goes farther in relationism — the doctrine that space and time are a family 
of spatial and temporal relations holding among the material constituents of the universe — in 
that it affirms that the “ultimate material constituents” are (i) formless and (ii) numerically 
identical. It also demolishes the notion that the physical world can be understood in terms of (a 
multitude of) ultimate constituents and of the ways they interact and combine. The 
manifestation of the world is essentially the manifestation of material forms. Instead of being 
constituents of material things and parts of the manifested world, subatomic particles, atoms, 
and molecules are instrumental in the manifestation of material forms. They occupy a 
(conceptual) position intermediate between Being and the manifested world. 
Because the manifestation of the world includes the manifestation of space and time, it cannot 
be conceived as a process that takes place in time. We keep looking for the origin of the universe 
at the beginning of time, but this is an error of perspective. The origin of the universe is Being, 
and the manifestation of the universe is an atemporal transition from undifferentiated Being to 
a world that is maximally differentiated spacewise as well as timewise. Maximally but not 
completely, for the manifested world is not differentiated “all the way down” (Mohrhoff, 2009a, 
Sect. 7; 2011a, Sect. 10; 2014a, Sect. 4). 
Here, in brief, is why. A detector is needed not only to indicate the presence of a particle in a 
region of space but also — and in the first place — to realize or define a region, so as to make it 
possible to attribute to a particle the property of being inside. Speaking more generally, a 
macroscopic apparatus is needed not only to indicate the possession of a property by a quantum 
system but also — and in the first place — to make a set of properties available for attribution to 
the system. In addition, macroscopic clocks are needed to realize attributable times. This, of 
course, is vintage Bohr (1935), who rightly insisted that the “procedure of measurement has an 
essential influence on the conditions on which the very definition of the physical quantities in 
question rests.” But if detectors are needed to realize regions of space, space cannot be 
intrinsically partitioned. It is partitioned only to the extent that the requisite detectors are 
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physically possible. Because this extent is limited by the “uncertainty” principle, physical space 
cannot be realistically modeled as an actually existing manifold of intrinsically distinct points. In 
other words, the spatial differentiation of the physical world is incomplete. And because 
macroscopic clocks are needed to realize attributable times, a similar argument leads to the 
conclusion that the temporal differentiation of the physical world is incomplete as well. 
Quantum theory thus reverses the explanatory arrow of both common sense and classical 
physics. Instead of allowing us to explain wholes in terms of their interacting parts, it suggests to 
us how the multiplicity of the world emerges from an intrinsically undifferentiated Being. 
The transition from the unqualified unity of Being to the multiplicity of the macroworld passes 
through several stages. Across these stages, the world’s differentiation into distinguishable 
regions of space and distinguishable objects with definite properties is being gradually realized. 
There is a stage at which Being presents itself as a multitude of formless particles. This stage is 
probed by high-energy physics and known to us through correlations between the counterfactual 
clicks of imagined detectors, i.e., in terms of transition probabilities between in-states and out-
states. There are stages that mark the emergence of form, albeit a type of form that cannot yet be 
visualized. The forms of nucleons, nuclei, and atoms can only be mathematically described, as 
probability distributions over abstract spaces of increasingly higher dimensions. At energies low 
enough for atoms to be stable, it becomes possible to conceive of objects with fixed numbers of 
components, and these we describe in terms of correlations between the possible outcomes of 
unperformed measurements. The next stage, closest to the manifested world, contains the first 
objects with forms that can be visualized — the atomic configurations of molecules — but it is 
only the final stage — the manifested, macroscopic world — that contains the actual detector 
clicks and the actual measurement outcomes that allow us to test the correlations that quantum 
mechanics predicts. 
Many of the mysteries surrounding quantum mechanics become clear in this light. Why, after 
all, is the general theoretical framework of contemporary physics a probability calculus, and why 
are its probabilities assigned to measurement outcomes? If quantum mechanics concerns a 
transition through which the differentiation of reality into distinguishable objects and 
distinguishable regions of space is gradually realized, the question arises as to how the 
intermediate stages are to be described — the stages at which the differentiation is incomplete 
and the distinguishability between objects or regions of space is only partially realized. The 
answer to this question is that whatever is not completely distinguishable can only be described 
by assigning probabilities to what is completely distinguishable, namely, to the different possible 
outcomes of a measurement. What is instrumental in the manifestation of the world can only be 
described in terms of what happens in the manifested world, or else in terms of correlations 
between events that could happen in the manifested world. (Think of the textbook descriptions 
of the stationary states of a hydrogen atom, which are correlations between preparations — 
measurements determining the atom’s energy, its total angular momentum, and a component of 
its angular momentum — and probability distributions assigned on the basis of the outcomes of 
these measurements.)  
But is it even consistent with quantum mechanics to regard certain measurable quantities as 
definite per se? Here is a related question: are there localizable particles? According to a 
theorem due to Clifton and Halvorson (2002), there is no quantum state such that the 
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probability of finding a particle in a finite region of space is 1. From this, Clifton and Halvorson 
have drawn the conclusion that the experience of detecting particles in finite regions of space is 
“illusory” and “strictly fictional.” What they have actually shown is that particles cannot be 
localized relative to the spacetime manifold M postulated by quantum field theory. But M is not 
where experiments are performed. What is illusory is the notion that attributable positions are 
defined by spatial regions of M. Attributable positions are defined by the sensitive regions of 
detectors, which, according to said theorem, also cannot be localized in any finite region of 
space. What is strictly fictional therefore is M, inasmuch as this cannot be localized relative to 
the positions that particles can possess. 
The positions of detectors, in turn, are defined by the positions of macroscopic objects 
(macroscopic positions, for short). “Macroscopic” is one of the most elusive terms routinely used 
by physicists. What makes it possible at last to rigorously define it is that the spatial 
differentiation of the world doesn’t go “all the way down” (Mohrhoff 2009a, 2014a). Here is the 
argument in brief: In a world that is incompletely differentiated spacewise, the next best thing to 
an object with a sharp position is an object whose position probability distribution is and 
remains so narrow that there are no detectors with narrower position probability distributions 
— detectors that could probe the region over which the object’s position extends. The events by 
which the values of macroscopic positions are indicated are therefore correlated in ways that are 
consistent with the laws of motion that quantum mechanics yields in the classical limit. (There is 
one necessary exception: in order to permit a macroscopic object — the proverbial pointer — to 
indicate a measured value, its position must be allowed to change unpredictably if and when it 
serves to indicate a measured value.) What makes it possible to treat macroscopic positions as 
definite per se is that macroscopic objects follow trajectories that are only counterfactually 
indefinite. Their positions are “smeared out” only in relation to an imaginary spatiotemporal 
background that is more differentiated than the manifested world. In a word, macroscopic 
objects follow definite trajectories because they define what we mean by a (definite) trajectory, 
and they have persistent identities because they follow (definite) trajectories. 
Appendix 
What holds the key to the mysterious presence of consciousness in what appears to be a material 
universe is the self-identical Being that constitutes every particle in existence. The root of 
consciousness is not to be found in the manifested world, nor in the process of manifestation, 
but in that which manifests the world. For Being does not simply manifest the world (by 
entering into reflexive spatial relations); Being manifests the world to itself. Being relates to the 
world not only as the substance that constitutes it but also as the consciousness that contains it. 
It is at once the single substance by which the world exists and the ultimate self or subject for 
which it exists. 
How, then, are we as conscious beings related to this ultimate self or subject? This question has 
been answered in considerable detail and on a solid experiential foundation by the Indian 
philosopher (and freedom fighter, and mystic) Sri Aurobindo (Heehs, 2008). In keeping with a 
more than millennium-long philosophical tradition (Phillips, 1995), Sri Aurobindo (2005) posits 
an Ultimate Reality whose intrinsic nature is (objectively speaking) infinite Quality and 
(subjectively speaking) infinite Delight. This has the power to manifest its inherent 
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Quality/Delight in finite forms, and the closest description of this manifestation is that of an all-
powerful consciousness creating its own content. 
In the native poise of this consciousness, its single self is coextensive with its content and 
identical with the substance that constitutes the content. There, but only there, it is true that 
esse est percipi (to be is to be perceived). 
A first self-modification of this supramental consciousness leads to a poise in which the one self 
adopts a multitude of standpoints, localizing itself multiply within the content of its 
consciousness and viewing the same in perspective. It is in this secondary poise that the 
dimensions of experiential space (viewer-centered depth and lateral extent) come into being. It 
is also here that the dichotomy between subject and object, or self and substance, becomes a 
reality. 
Probably the most adequate description of the process by which the one original self assumes a 
multitude of standpoints is that of a multiple concentration of consciousness. A further self-
modification of the original creative consciousness occurs when this multiple concentration 
becomes exclusive. We all know the phenomenon of exclusive concentration, when 
consciousness is focused on a single object or task, while other goings-on are registered 
subconsciously, if at all. A similar phenomenon transforms individuals who are conscious of 
their essential identity into individuals who have lost sight of this identity and, as a 
consequence, have lost access to the supramental view of things. Their consciousness is mental, 
which means not only that it belongs to what appears to be a separate individual but also that it 
perceives or presents the world as a multitude of separate objects. Mentally conscious beings 
thus come into existence not only by an evolution from seemingly unconscious matter but also, 
and in the first place, by a multiple exclusive concentration of the creative consciousness 
inherent in Being. 
If this multiple exclusive concentration is carried to its logical conclusion, the result is a world 
whose inhabitants lack both the ability to generate ideas (which is a function of the principle of 
mind) and the power to execute them (which is a function of the principle of life). And since the 
latter is also responsible for the existence of individual forms, the result is a world of formless 
individuals — the fundamental particles of physics. This is how (from our temporal perspective) 
the original creative consciousness came to be “involved” in mind, how mind came to be 
“involved” in life, and how life came to be “involved” in formless particles. (If the form of a 
material object resolves itself into its internal spatial relations, a fundamental particle, lacking 
internal relations, is a formless entity.) And because these principles are involved in formless 
particles, matter is capable of evolving life, life is capable of evolving mind, and mental 
consciousness can and eventually will evolve the supramental consciousness — the power by 
which Being manifests the world. 
How does Being manifest a cosmos (rather than pure, indeterministic chaos) in which life and 
mind (and supermind) are “involved”? Clearly, Being’s reflexive spatial relations must be 
governed by seemingly inflexible laws possibly of a statistical nature. Furthermore, setting the 
stage for the drama of evolution calls for objects that are spatially extended (they “occupy” 
space) and are sufficiently stable (they neither explode nor collapse as soon as they are formed). 
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Because that stage has been set by carrying the multiple exclusive concentration of 
consciousness to its logical conclusion, such objects will be, or will appear to be, “made of” finite 
numbers of formless particles — particles that do not “occupy” space. As I have argued 
elsewhere (Mohrhoff, 2002, 2009b, 2011b), the existence of such objects not only implies the 
validity of quantum mechanics but also goes a long way toward establishing the other well-
tested laws of contemporary physics (the Standard Model and General Relativity). These laws, 
then, are preconditions of the possibility of an evolutionary manifestation of Being — a Being 
that relates to the world not only as the substance by which it exists but also as a (supramental) 
consciousness for which it exists. 
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